

Strategic Analysis

Dynamic Pricing in the Multi-Location Medspa Vertical

Market opportunity brief. May 2026. Where the yield management wedge sits in a \$18B+, 14% CAGR, 60%+ gross-margin industry undergoing active PE consolidation.


Bottom line. The US medspa market is \$18B+ in 2024 and projected to reach \$44.5B by 2030 at a 14-15% CAGR. The industry is structurally fragmented (81% single-location, 90% independently owned) but rapidly consolidating: 30+ active PE platforms are competing for the 95% of the market that is not yet roll-up-acquired. The strategic opportunity sits at the intersection of three facts: (a) medspa appointments are perishable inventory with structurally idle midday capacity, (b) the top services carry 50-70% gross margins, leaving substantial pricing room to incentivize off-peak demand, and (c) the existing software vendors recognize the problem in their published research but have only built rudimentary peak/off-peak rules inside broader practice management systems. A focused, multi-location yield management engine purpose-built for medspas sits inside a defensible gap with named PE-backed buyer candidates already feeling the problem.

1. Market overview

The US medspa market grew from approximately \$9.5B in 2020 to \$18B+ in 2024, and is projected to reach \$44.5B by 2030 at a 14-15% CAGR. Location count grew from 8,899 in 2022 to 10,488 in 2023 (a 17.9% growth rate), with the American Med Spa Association projecting 12,000+ locations by 2026. Average revenue per location was \$1.39M in 2023, growing to \$1.40M+ in 2024, with over 80% of operators expecting further revenue growth in 2025.

The service mix is concentrated around injectables (Botox, dermal fillers), which represent approximately 40% of average medspa revenue and carry 50-70% gross margins. IV therapy and vitamin injection services run even higher unit economics (\$25-100 cost to deliver, \$150-350 price per session). The category is positioned as cash-pay (no insurance reimbursement exposure) with recurring treatment cycles, which is the dual structural reason PE has identified medspas as a compelling consolidation play.

US Medspa Market Size, 2020 to 2030 (Projected)



Sources: Ankura, Expert Market Research, American Med Spa Association 2024 State of the Industry Report.

2. Industry structure and consolidation activity

The market is unusually fragmented for an industry of its size. 81% of medspas operate as single-location practices. Among multi-location operators, the average footprint grew from 3 locations in 2022 to 9 in 2023, a step-change driven almost entirely by PE-backed roll-ups. Only 3-4% of medspas are currently PE-consolidated, but 30+ active PE platforms are competing for the remaining 95%+ of the market, according to the American Med Spa Association.

Named consolidation activity in the past 24 months includes:

Princeton Medspa Partners (PMP): a \$120M funding round dedicated to multi-state expansion, led by Matt Slaine (previously CEO of OT Growth Partners, the largest PE-backed Orangetheory Fitness franchise platform).

MedSpa Partners (MSP): 40+ clinics acquired across North America, backed by a \$275M continuation fund anchored by Morgan Stanley PE.

VIO Med Spa: Freeman Spogli took a majority stake in 2024 with plans to expand to 50+ locations by year-end.

Advanced MedAesthetic Partners (AMP): 14 medspas under partnership.

The strategic implication: there is now a meaningful population of multi-location chains (9 to 50+ locations each) that need centralized pricing intelligence to justify the PE multiple they were acquired at. This is a new buyer profile that did not exist at scale 24 months ago.

3. The strategic problem: idle capacity in a perishable-inventory business

Medspa appointments are perishable inventory. An unbooked midday slot is permanent revenue loss, the same way an empty airline seat or hotel room at takeoff or checkout is. The structural pattern is consistent across the industry: peak demand sits in evenings and weekends (when patients can leave personal time for treatment), while midday capacity (roughly 11:00 AM to 2:00 PM on weekdays) runs structurally underutilized because patients cannot easily leave work for a 60-to-90-minute treatment.

The economics are particularly stark in the medspa context because the gross margins on the top services are 50-70%. There is significant pricing room to incentivize off-peak demand without destroying unit economics. A 15% midday discount on a \$600 injectable service still delivers a ~50% gross margin contribution, compared to \$0 from the same slot sitting empty. Multi-location operators face this problem at scale: 9 locations × 5 weekdays × 4 idle midday slots per day = thousands of revenue-loss events per year per chain.

4. The vendor signal

The existing medspa software vendors explicitly recognize the idle-capacity problem and have published research and product blogs recommending dynamic pricing and yield management as the solution. Two specific signals stand out:

AestheticsPro (case study): published research showing a clinic launched a "Lunchtime LED" 15-minute light therapy service available only in 11:30 AM to 2:00 PM slots and filled with automated gap detection in their software. The result:

"They increased weekday bookings by 21% in 90 days."

Pabau (thought leadership and product positioning): maintains multiple blog posts explicitly recommending yield management, dynamic pricing, and time-based pricing strategies. Their product page directly states the value proposition:

"Smart scheduling — Automatically adjust prices based on peak hours, provider availability, and appointment demand, helping you fill gaps and improve financial performance."

The implication is significant. The vendors closest to the customer are the ones telling the market the problem exists. They are publishing the case studies. They are writing the thought leadership. They are recommending the solution category. The customer-facing problem statement is already validated by the people who would be the natural competitors.

5. Why existing solutions leave a gap

Both AestheticsPro and Pabau ship pricing functionality, but neither is a focused yield management engine. The pricing capabilities are rules-based peak/off-peak modules embedded inside broader practice management systems. Examined feature by feature:

| Vendor | Core positioning | Pricing capability | Gap |
|---------------|--|--|---|
| AestheticsPro | Medspa-specific PMS | Automated gap detection. Manual lunchtime promotions. | No real-time demand-supply pricing engine. Operator still designs the offer manually. |
| Pabau | All-in-one PMS for medspas and clinics | Rules-based smart pricing (peak hours, provider, demand trends). | Rules-based, not algorithmic. Single-location logic, not multi-location centralized intelligence. |

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|-----------------------------|--|--------------------------------------|--|
| Mindbody, Boulevard, Vagaro | Generic salon/spa/wellness booking | Basic peak/off-peak pricing rules. | Not medspa-specific. No injectable margin model. No multi-location chain-level intelligence. |
| Square, Acuity | Horizontal SMB scheduling and payments | Static pricing. No yield management. | Generic. Not built for the perishable-inventory pricing problem at all. |

The pattern across the existing landscape is consistent: pricing is a feature inside a system, not a system itself. None of the existing solutions are built around the central question a multi-location PE-backed medspa operator actually asks: *across all my locations right now, what is the optimal price for the next 90 days of slots that maximizes total contribution margin?*

6. The strategic wedge

The opening for a category-defining product sits at the intersection of three structural conditions:

A defined buyer profile that did not exist at scale 24 months ago. PE-backed multi-location chains (9 to 50+ locations) are now a discoverable, named cohort. Their CFOs and COOs are measured on EBITDA improvement. Idle capacity reduction is one of the highest-leverage operational improvements available without adding headcount or capex.

A validated problem statement coming from the competition. The existing PMS vendors are the ones writing the case studies and the thought leadership. The market does not need to be educated on whether the problem exists. It needs to be sold on a better solution.

A defensible product surface. A focused yield management engine, purpose-built for medspas, with real-time demand-supply algorithms (not rules), centralized multi-location intelligence, and an injectable-margin-aware pricing model, is a meaningfully different product from anything currently shipping. It can integrate with the existing PMS systems rather than replace them, which lowers the switching cost for the buyer.

7. Named opportunity set

The PE-backed multi-location chains with the strongest fit for a yield management product include:

Princeton Medspa Partners (national platform, \$120M funding round, multi-state expansion mandate). MedSpa Partners (40+ clinics, Morgan Stanley PE-backed). VIO Med Spa (Freeman Spogli majority, 50+ location target). Advanced MedAesthetic Partners (14 medspas). Formula Wellness (Trive Capital-backed, actively seeking add-ons). Princeton, MSP, and VIO have all closed financing rounds with explicit multi-state expansion mandates in the past 18 months, which is the operational moment where centralized pricing intelligence becomes a near-term EBITDA lever rather than a nice-to-have.

8. Analytical observations

Vendor-published thought leadership is a stronger signal than primary research. When the competitors are publishing the case studies that validate your problem statement, the market has already done the customer education work for you. The remaining question is execution and go-to-market speed.

The wedge in mature markets often sits where the problem is acknowledged but the solution is embedded in something else. AestheticsPro and Pabau both ship pricing features. Neither has built a focused yield management product. "Feature inside a system" vs. "system itself" is where category-defining products are born.

PE consolidation creates predictable B2B software buyer profiles. When a category goes from 95% single-location to 50%+ PE-rolled-up over a 5-year horizon, the operational requirements of the new entity type create demand for new categories of vertical software. Multi-location medspa chains are at the inflection point of that transition now.

Personal strategic analysis. Not investment advice. Not affiliated with any registered investment firm or consulting practice. Sources: Ankura, Greenwich Capital Group, American Med Spa Association 2024 State of the Industry Report, Expert Market Research, Precedence Research, Mordor Intelligence, AestheticsPro, Pabau, Princeton Medspa Partners, Aesthetic Brokers, MedEsthetics.